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Abstract
Background: Citizens of high income countries rely on highly regulated medicines markets. However low income
countries’ impoverished populations generally struggle for access to essential medicines through out-of-pocket
purchase on poorly regulated markets; results include ill health, drug resistance and further impoverishment. While
the role of health facilities owned by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in low income countries is well
documented, national and international wholesaling of essential medicines by NGOs is largely unstudied. This
article describes and assesses the activity of NGOs and social enterprise in essential medicines wholesaling.
Methods: The article is based on a set of interviews conducted in 2006-8 with trading NGOs and social enterprises
operating in Europe, India and Tanzania. The analysis applies socio-legal and economic perspectives on social
enterprise and market regulation.
Results: Trading NGOs can resist the perverse incentives inherent in medicines wholesaling and improve access to
essential medicines; they can also, in definable circumstances, exercise a broader regulatory influence over their markets
by influencing the behaviour of competitors. We explore reasons for success and failure of social enterprise in essential
medicines wholesaling, including commercial manufacturers’ market response; social enterprise traders’ own market
strategies; and patterns of market advantage, market segmentation and subsidy generated by donors.
Conclusions: We conclude that, in the absence of effective governmental activity and regulation, social enterprise
wholesaling can improve access to good quality essential medicines. This role should be valued and where
appropriate supported in international health policy design. NGO regulatory impact can complement but should
not replace state action.
Introduction
The aims of this article are the following. We first aim to
document the importance, for access to medicines in low
income contexts, of the largely unresearched role of social
enterprise in essential medicines wholesaling, drawing on
a unique dataset of interviews undertaken in Europe, India
and Tanzania. Second, we seek to explain the extent and
limits of the market impact of this social enterprise whole-
saling by using economic and socio-legal theory and our
interview evidence to sketch an analytical understanding
of the scope for social enterprise to be market-regulating.
In developing this argument, we identify benefits that can
flow from social enterprise trading; limitations placed on
social enterprise success by commercial competition; and
some conditions for the emergence of a distinct ‘social
market’ segment of medicines markets where social enter-
prise can effectively shape the terms of exchange to the
benefit of low income consumers. We conclude that a bet-
ter understanding of the role of social enterprise in the
problematic but socially important market for essential
medicines, should be incorporated into health and devel-
opment research and policy.
Background
Most people in Africa and India lack regular access to
safe essential medicines [1]. India has a highly developed
pharmaceutical industry, yet appropriate reliable medi-
cines do not reach most low income people in India nor
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in African countries to which India exports medicines
[2]. Instead, these populations experience substandard
medicines, inappropriate and incomplete treatments,
excess ill health and mortality, drug-resistant disease,
exclusion from treatment, and further impoverishment
when they struggle to pay [1,3-6].
These outcomes result from extreme poverty in a
vicious interaction with under-regulated retail medicines
markets. Asymmetric information in these markets cre-
ates perverse incentives to sell inappropriate and poor
quality medicines. Branding is also used to segment the
market and support monopoly pricing for those able to
pay [1,7]. A UN medicines expert interviewed for this
project argued:
‘at every step of the supply chain there is this
unequal knowledge, and people are exploited because
of that lack of knowledge.’
In India and Sub-Saharan Africa, public purchasing
can improve quality and reduce prices, but public fund-
ing of drugs is grossly inadequate and often poorly
spent [8-11].
International and national, faith-based and secular
NGOs have responded by providing and funding health
care in both India and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and
by campaigning. The recent huge increase in aid funding
for medicines for HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria has been
routed increasingly through nongovernmental organisa-
tions [12]. NGOs including Health Action International
(HAI) and the Treatment Action Campaign based in
South Africa have campaigned to force down prices of
HIV/AIDS and other medicines [13,14]. Furthermore,
NGOs have worked with the WHO to develop essential
medicines lists that identify the most cost-effective,
mainly generic medicines for each major illness. In
India, the All India Drug Action Network (AIDAN) [15]
of NGOs working to increase access and improve the
rational use of medicines has influenced policy, for
example by weeding out harmful and irrational
formulations.
However the research literature has largely ignored the
important role of NGOs in quality assurance and trad-
ing essential medicines. Web searches of the medical
and social science literature using key terms including
drugs, medicines, NGOs, non-profit, wholesaling and
trading produced no survey of this activity.
Theory and methods
Trading NGOs and market failure
NGO wholesalers of essential medicines can influence
access in two ways: by directly improving price, quality
and accessibility for users of their products, and also by
influencing the behaviour of other market participants.
We examine both roles in this article. Economic theory
and empirical work has generally focused on explaining
the first role. Trading NGOs (for example, non-profit
hospitals) are argued to arise in health care as solutions
to market failures. The classic statement of this argu-
ment is by Kenneth Arrow:
‘I propose here the view that, when the market fails
to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some
extent at least, recognise the gap, and non-market
social institutions will arise attempting to bridge it.’
[16]
Non-profit firms are argued to have a market advan-
tage because they cannot distribute financial surpluses
to shareholders. Hence, they have less monetary incen-
tive than private firms to cheat poorly informed custo-
mers by reducing quality in order to increase profits.
Customers therefore regard them as more trustworthy
and are willing to pay a premium price for more reliable
quality [17]. Trustworthiness is further strengthened if
people more inclined to ethical behaviour are dispropor-
tionately attracted to work in socially oriented firms (a
‘selection effect’) [18,19].
NGOs as market regulators?
Much less analytical attention has been paid to the sec-
ond role [20,21]. However there is accumulating evi-
dence from Asia and the USA that a substantial
presence of non-commercial providers in health care
markets can influence positively the quality of commer-
cial provision [22,20]. An effect of this kind, sometimes
called ‘beneficial competition’ [23], whereby socially
oriented enterprises influence the behaviour of commer-
cial firms in the same market, can be characterised as a
market regulatory effect, since it shapes incentive struc-
tures and market outcomes.
That characterisation stems from the socio-legal litera-
ture on regulation, which contrasts narrow definitions of
formal governmental regulation with broader concepts
that include non-state actors [24]. Formal regulation is
the state’s standard-setting, rule-setting and enforcement
role, including registration, licensing, inspection of facil-
ities and firms, and proscription of activities such as sale
of listed medicines without prescription.
A contrasting informal concept of regulation describes
the shaping of market behaviour by ‘regulatory webs’ of
actors and discourse [25]. The state is one actor in such
webs. Informal regulation can be understood as a dis-
cursively produced informal governance structure for a
market. Informal regulatory norms are not simply firms’
behavioural regularities - though these constitute evi-
dence for such norms - but rather something akin to a
‘script’ rooted in past experience of expectations fulfilled
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and in a shared discourse concerning market behaviour
[23,26-28]. In pharmaceutical markets, corporate culture
may be more influential than state rule-making in shap-
ing risk and outcomes [25].
Social enterprise
The concept of social enterprise used in this article is
more inclusive than the category of firms legally consti-
tuted as non-profit [29,30], since we aim to capture cul-
tural and behavioural aspects of the firms studied. Social
enterprises are defined as organisations reflecting an
‘entrepreneurial spirit focused on social aims’ [31,32], or
more simply, firms with social aims operating in
markets [33].
Research methods
As part of a broader study of the supply chain of essen-
tial medicines from manufacturers in India, Kenya,
Tanzania and elsewhere to rural areas in Tanzania, we
interviewed social enterprise wholesalers in India,
Tanzania and Europe.
Between one and three senior procurement managers
were interviewed in late 2006 and 2007 in Europe-based
non-governmental actors in the wholesale market for
essential medicines for low income countries. We aimed
for an exhaustive set of interviews with all important
market actors. Given the lack of a pre-existing sampling
frame, the organisations were located through web
searches for medicines procurement agents and wholesa-
lers, and the list was then snowballed by asking each firm
about their main competitors, the key funding bodies,
and the main intergovernmental organisations influen-
cing the market. Only one non-profit trader and one rela-
tively small private firm refused to be interviewed. All but
one of the UN bodies and charities interviewed procured
medicines not only for their own projects but also for
sale to NGOs and government sectors in developing
countries. We included the non-profit trading arms of
charities and inter-governmental bodies, and also inter-
viewed large funders and the WHO (Table 1; 25 inter-
views in total). The broader project also included
interviews with international and Indian NGO activists
[14].
In India, NGOs run healthcare facilities such as hospi-
tals and clinics, providing free or subsidized medicines.
However a search for NGO wholesale enterprises aiming
to influence the supply chain from manufacturers to
users showed there is little such activity. Two exceptions
were identified and studied: LOCOST (Low Cost Stan-
dard Therapeutics) and Community Development Med-
icinal Unit (CDMU). LOCOST manufactures drugs for
sale to other NGOs, and CDMU is a wholesaler distri-
buting medicines to other NGOs. Interviews and data
collection with CDMU and LOCOST in 2006-7 were
followed by interviews with 17 member organisations of
CDMU, and by email correspondence with LOCOST.
Except where stated, all data and documents were
obtained directly from CDMU and LOCOST.
In Tanzania, the only two NGO wholesalers were
interviewed as part of a larger set of interviews and data
collection in late 2006 described in detail elsewhere [6].
Six private importer-wholesalers agreed to be inter-
viewed, from a list of ten key firms provided by the reg-
ulatory authorities. Senior public and NGO officials
were also interviewed. Medicines retailers and non-
governmental health facilities were interviewed in four
rural districts, and a set of 31 tracer medicines were
used for price data collection [6]. Ethical clearance for
the study was obtained from a UK university and from
the Tanzanian authorities. Written consent forms were
used. Interviewees were promised anonymity, and where
specific organisations are cited in this article, permission
has been sought from interviewees.
Interviews in the three sites were semi-structured.
Indian interviews and Tanzanian interviews with private
firms were recorded in notes after the interview. All
European interviews and the NGO interviews in Tanza-
nia were taped and transcribed. Limited associated doc-
umentation was located: published accounts and firms’
websites where available, and official reports and busi-
ness periodical literature, some cited here. Market price
surveys in India are used in our analysis of NGOs’
impact, as are our own price survey data in Tanzania.
Our interviews therefore contribute to the health lit-
erature a unique qualitative data set on NGOs and med-
icines wholesaling. The evidence is single-round, not
longitudinal, and our Tanzanian price data are not
drawn from a national random sample. Our evidence of
benefits of NGO wholesaling is thus largely qualitative,
drawn from interviews with NGO facilities purchasing
from the wholesalers in Tanzania and India. Such quali-
tative evidence is widely used in socio-legal analysis of
market behaviour and regulation [24]. It does not permit
statistical generalisation.
Table 1 Organisations based in Europe interviewed, by
category
Type of organisation Number of
organisations
Non-profit wholesaler 2
For-profit wholesaler 3
Charity wholesaling medicines 2
UN body wholesaling medicines 2
UN body with a regulatory role 1
Other international body purchasing or funding
medicines
1
Other international NGO distributing medicines
or campaigning
2
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Analysis for this article cross-referenced ownership
structure with aspects of reported business behaviour,
and triangulated interviewees’ statements about the
behaviour of competitors and the evolution of market
competition. The article is thus interpretative and
exploratory. We set out evidence from the interviews on
the business strategies and market contexts that permit
social enterprise to exercise beneficial influence on the
terms of trading within medicines markets for low
income consumers.
Results and discussion
We combine results with discussion in order to link evi-
dence and interpretation on each point in this mainly
qualitative analysis. All evidence cited, including the
initial contextual outline of the three markets, is drawn
from the interview data unless otherwise stated and
referenced. After briefly outlining the three contexts, we
first show that quality control is seen by the firms as
key to NGO wholesaling success in each market. We
then analyse, for the European context, the evidence
that NGOs can exert informal regulatory influence on
their market. Next, drawing on Indian experience, we
show how, in contrast, NGO success can elicit commer-
cial responses that undermine their market position.
Finally, we explore the implications of commercial and
regulatory changes at the global level and show that
there are opportunities opening up for African social
enterprise wholesaling in essential medicines to benefit
African populations.
Trading in essential medicines for low income consumers:
NGOs in three contexts
In the international market for essential medicines for
low-income Africa, trading organisations with a social
mission, based in Europe, have played an important but
poorly documented role since the 1970s. The firms
interviewed stated that they buy predominantly from
Indian manufacturers. The market they supply is funded
by a mix of developing country government and interna-
tional donor funding - including the Global Fund for
HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (henceforth ‘the Global
Fund’) and PEPFAR (the US President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief) - alongside substantial out-of-pocket
spending by consumers in developing countries.
The wholesalers interviewed sell to government buy-
ing agencies and semi-autonomous Central Medical
Stores; to international emergency relief agencies and
charities such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and Médicins sans Frontières, and UN
bodies. They also sell to non-governmental organisa-
tions, including church-supported buying agencies and
charities supplying mainly faith-based and secular NGO
facilities [34]. The firms thus supply a ‘social’ market,
supplying government and non-profit sectors. This oper-
ates alongside an international private market for medi-
cines for African countries, regulated only by African
government import and registration requirements [35],
and at the time of the interviews largely unaffected by
major funding initiatives.
It is difficult to estimate the size of this social market.
In 2006, 33 African countries in the least developed
country category were estimated to import medicines
worth in total around US$1.6 billion [35]. This figure
includes private market imports, but conversely substan-
tial amounts of aid-funded medicines (including emer-
gency aid) escape inclusion in import totals. Proportions
of all imported medicines that are procured by govern-
ments or NGOs in African countries vary widely and
are poorly documented. In Tanzania, local procurement
experts estimated that around 70% of medicines con-
sumed were imported in 2006, and about 50% of the
market was supplied by government or NGO procure-
ment. By contrast in Nigeria the largely unregulated pri-
vate medicines market is very dominant [1]. Estimated
procurement of medicines for Africa in 2006 (not
including vaccines) by seven of the wholesalers inter-
viewed for this project totalled around US$300 million.
One major charity refused however to give a figure.
This total certainly underestimates total ‘social’ medi-
cines procurement for Africa.
The International Dispensary Association (IDA) played
a pioneering role from 1972 onwards in shaping this
market through non-profit wholesaling. IDA was estab-
lished in the Netherlands with the involvement of stu-
dent campaigners for essential medicines lists and the
rational use of medicines. It aimed to supply reliable
generic essential medicines, and it became the most suc-
cessful of several non-profit traders established in that
era, including Christian charities supplying medicines
for mission facilities in Africa, some of which have sur-
vived. Another large non-profit trader was later spun off
from a government department, and medicine procure-
ment and trading arms were established in Europe by
two UN agencies.
By the early 1980s for-profit competitors had joined
this market, mainly family-owned and entrepreneurial
businesses. All those interviewed also supplied entirely
or mainly non-profit buyers. One wholesaler’s 2006
turnover, for example, was divided roughly 60% sales to
government purchasers, 20% NGO buyers including
small and large mission customers in Africa and big
international NGOs; 15% United Nations; 5% other.
This balance varied between firms and over time; major
emergencies for example changed the balance of sales.
Within India, CDMU and LOCOST each stated that
they sought to address the huge unmet need for access
to safe, rationally prescribed medicines. CDMU was set
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up in Kolkata in 1984 as a Central Drug Marketing Unit
of the West Bengal Voluntary Health Association, and
became an autonomous organization in 1986. Its goals
include [36]: provision of quality essential drugs to
member-partners at affordable cost; provision of
unbiased information on rational drug use to health
professionals and consumers; and negotiating with the
government to formulate people-oriented drug policies
and weed out irrational and hazardous drugs from the
Indian market.
CDMU was perhaps the first organization in India to
apply WHO concepts of essential medicines to influence
proper use of drugs. This was remarkable in the mid-
1980s: the pooled procurement by the Tamil Nadu
Medical Services Corporation (TNMSC) and Delhi hos-
pitals have used similar selection exercises only since
the mid-1990s [8,9]. CDMU procures medicines for sale
only to non-profit member organizations (MOs): NGOs
and faith-based organizations providing free or subsi-
dized healthcare. Some purchase drugs regularly, others
occasionally, and some only for relief work during nat-
ural calamities.
LOCOST was set up in Vadodara (Gujarat) in 1983
and started drug supply operations in 1985. It similarly
caters mainly to voluntary health care organizations.
Unlike CDMU, which is concentrated in West Bengal,
LOCOST products are supplied more widely, through
depots in Bangalore and Guwahati to cater to South
Indian organisations and to those in the North East.
LOCOST was set up by a small group of health pro-
fessional members of Medico Friends Circle, an all-India
organization of individuals concerned particularly about
the rural health situation. They saw that good quality
drugs were generally costly; cheaper drugs were not of
proper quality; and many essential drugs were not avail-
able particularly in remote areas. Initially LOCOST pro-
cured drugs from small scale manufacturers. Soon, it
began manufacturing on loan licence, i.e. drugs were
manufactured for the LOCOST label under LOCOST
supervision. LOCOST set up its own small scale manu-
facturing plant in 1993 to have better control over sup-
plies and quality. It produces over 60 essential
medicines in more than 80 formulations (liquid, capsule,
tablet) conforming to WHO quality standards, and now
manufacturers most of its drugs supplied. Like CDMU,
LOCOST has been involved in education, campaigning
and advocacy on rational use of medicines, safety, and
pricing and it is an active member of AIDAN.
In East Africa, NGO faith-based wholesalers are well
established in Kenya and Uganda. In Tanzania the gov-
ernment wholesaler supplies around 50% of the local
market, while a faith-based wholesale presence, small
but expanding in 2006, aims to complement it by filling
in gaps in supply. Action Medeor Tanzania, a non-profit
wholesaler with German support, was supplying local
NGO facilities; Mission for Essential Medical Supplies
(MEMS), a donor-supported local NGO, brokered and
supported effective purchasing by church-owned facil-
ities. In four rural districts studied, most NGO hospitals,
but fewer than half of NGO dispensaries and health
centres, purchased medicines from the government or
one of the NGO wholesale suppliers; the others bought
medicines on the private market [6].
Quality assurance at low prices: the key value-added
All the European firms interviewed, when asked about
their value-added, cited quality assurance and quality
control of low priced, mainly Indian-sourced medicines.
The IDA, the largest independent non-profit wholesaler,
said that it addressed this aim by supplying mainly its
own-brand generics: 80% sourced in India to reduce
prices, pre-packaged by manufacturers with IDA labels.
IDA quality assurance and quality control included
approving manufacturing sites for each product, and
testing all batches; a manager stated:
Our logistics buyer..... told me.... if the doctors would
see that they are getting IDA products, they would be
happy ... for them it’s really trust and guarantee of
quality.
In 2006, IDA still tested batches in the Netherlands:
an expensive process increasingly constrained by EU
regulations. Only one other (for-profit) firm branded
some of their bought-in generic medicines and also
tested all batches en route to Europe. Some competitors
disagreed with batch testing as the best route to ensur-
ing quality, and most regarded it as financially unviable,
as a for-profit firm’s manager commented:
We do not re-analyse all batches, because then we
would certainly be non-profit!
The European essential medicines wholesalers were,
they stated, under increasing competitive pressure, and the
interviews included mutual accusations of resultant weak-
ening of quality assurance. Quality assurance requires
close knowledge of suppliers and attention to documenta-
tion. Of the five independent wholesalers interviewed, two
non-profit and one for-profit firm did their own repeated
inspections of manufacturing sites. One used only suppli-
ers they had approved themselves. At the time of the
research, the WHO had recently begun ‘prequalification’
inspections of production of anti-retroviral medicines [37],
and these were accepted by some wholesalers. One UN
purchasing body and an international charity did their
own inspections or contracted for them. The other UN
body, the other international charity and one for-profit
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firm did no inspections, either buying only from European
sources (at higher prices) or using as procurement agent
another organisation that in turn did the quality assurance.
In India, both LOCOST and CDMU successfully
undercut commercial market prices, but only LOCOST
had ensured robust quality control. CDMU had under-
cut high-margin retail prices for MOs that were too
small to float tenders, and had ensured supplies even in
remote areas. CDMU prices were compared to commer-
cial retail prices for 18 large selling products using
Indian market survey databases [38,39]. CDMU prices
were found to be lower for 17 out of 18. Retail prices
exceeded CDMU price by between 1721.5% (nimesulide)
and 83.3% (ampicillin/cloxacillin) [2].
LOCOST similarly improved affordability of medicines
[40] (Table 2)
The challenge, as for all the firms interviewed, was to
combine lower prices and quality control with financial
stability. CDMU has consistently struggled financially.
Initially it grew fast: MOs registered rose from 38 in
1986 to 396 in 1997-98, and sales from Rs 2.23 million
in 1986 to Rs. 18.4 million in 1997-98. Since then how-
ever sales have fluctuated but stagnated, while CDMU
has incurred losses almost every year since 1986, fund-
ing those losses though donations.
The main reason is CDMU’s persistent weakness in
quality assurance. Among large MOs that dominate
CDMU procurement, Howrah South Point, for example,
installed testing equipment and found sub-standard
drugs; a problem CDMU failed to rectify. Two others,
Antara and Calcutta Rescue, reduced their purchases for
similar reasons. CDMU has from time to time adopted
basic physical testing in-house and analytical testing by
external government approved laboratories. Some manu-
facturers have been black listed. However, CDMU never
achieved effective quality assurance.
As a result CDMU’s Kolkata office incurred persistent
losses since it could not retain major purchasers. In
2002-03, 77% of sales were to just 18 MOs, each with
procurement above Rs 100,000; by 2007-8 the share of
these 18 had declined to 43%, and 4 had left CDMU.
Only CDMU’s Branch Office Siliguri, handling 40% of
total sales, made a financial surplus. Small scale pro-
curement by tea gardens that run health facilities in
remote areas of North Bengal accounted for 94.5% of
total Siliguri sales; these buyers have few other procure-
ment options.
In contrast to CDMU, LOCOST generates a surplus.
Its drug sales doubled between 2000-01 and 2007-08 to
Rs 25.47 million. LOCOST has an in-house quality-con-
trol laboratory where medicines are tested before being
supplied. Even when some drugs are available at lower
prices in the market, some NGOs continue to buy from
LOCOST because of the quality assurance. LOCOST
officials argue that they respond seriously to quality
complaints and have earned most customers’ trust. The
organisation’s financial surplus has funded minor plant
expansions, and it has gained Ford Foundation and
Bread for the World grants between 2001-5 to fund
upgrading to meet revised Indian government regulatory
requirements based on WHO Good Manufacturing
Practice (GMP) guidelines. It has however stopped man-
ufacturing liquids because it could not afford the
upgrading costs.
LOCOST has been the more successful at quality
assurance in good part because it appears to function
with a stronger sense of values and purpose than
CDMU. One of LOCOST’s founders, S. Srinivasan, was
its Managing Trustee and continued to guide its strat-
egy. The management structure was clear; the two man-
agers were well qualified and quite long-serving; and the
staff worked flexibly. CDMU in contrast had failed to
create an effective and value-based management struc-
ture. It was run by an Executive Committee without a
strong administrative head with proper autonomy and
accountability. Lack of proper management coordination
and the inability to take prompt actions in Kolkata had
left problems unaddressed, including complaints of
uncooperative and unresponsive behaviour by some
CDMU staff.
The two Tanzanian NGOs took different approaches
to quality assurance. MEMS in 2006 was assisting faith-
based hospitals to upgrade their stock control and
ordering. Their orders went through a local private
wholesaler who ordered imports from IDA and relied
on IDA quality assurance. MEMS also did some quality
control checks using mini-labs and local laboratories.
MEMS was at the time 90% donor-funded, and also
charged a commission on sales.
Action Medeor Tanzania had a warehouse in Dar es Sal-
aam; the initial investment was made by Action Medeor
Germany in 2004. This Tanzanian NGO procured around
60% of their medicines from Tanzanian and Kenyan sup-
pliers, and did its own regular plant inspections. They also
inspected all batches and did random testing using a
WHO-prequalified laboratory in Kenya and Tanzania
Food and Drug Authority (TFDA) facilities. The other
40% came from European manufacturers, for example in
Table 2 Comparison of LOCOST and market prices,
selected medicines
Drug LOCOST price Market price
Albendazole Rs. 11.0 per 10 tabs Rs 9- Rs.12 per tablet
Amlodipine Rs. 2.50 per 10 tab Rs. 14 to Rs. 48 per 10 tabs
Atenolol 50 mg Rs. 2.80 per 14 tab Rs. 4- Rs. 22 per 10 tab
Enalapril 5 mg Rs. 3.0 per 10 tabs Rs. 16- Rs. 23 per 10 tabs
Fluconazole 150 mg Rs. 35.00 per 10 tabs Rs. 28-32 per 1 tab
Source: [40].
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Cyprus, or from India via IDA relying on IDA quality
assurance. When interviewed, the firm was working
towards covering costs from their mark-up.
Both Tanzanian NGO wholesalers bought efficiently,
undercutting commercial wholesalers. For 24 tracer
medicines that were bought by all wholesalers inter-
viewed, the NGOs (like the public wholesaler) were buy-
ing at significantly lower prices than the private
wholesalers in 2006, and passing on these savings in
lower prices to NGO facilities as compared to private
sector facilities’ buying prices [6].
Shaping a social market: NGO benchmarking in the
European market
Given the market incentives to reduce quality, what
mechanisms keep many NGOs’ behaviour focused on
providing good quality, thus sustaining merited trust
from buyers? And to what extent does NGO presence
influence the company culture of competing firms. The
literature on NGO health services in Africa and in the
USA attributes trustworthiness mainly to religious
values-driven commitment to patients [41,42]. However
the cultural values of the Europe-based international tra-
ders had their roots in a more diverse mix of left wing
political engagement, religious mission-linked commit-
ment, and public sector procurement agency experience.
The for-profit European firms interviewed all claimed
a social mission that resembled that of the non-profit
traders: for example, one expressed it as ‘expanding the
availability of generic pharmaceuticals worldwide’. Sev-
eral had their origins in the non-profit sector. One early
charitable trader had by 2007 been taken over by a com-
mercial firm. The procurement manager explained the
history:
When they came back [from mission work in Africa]
the owner and his wife started the business in their
garage. It was a pure charity.
The new commercial owner had retained a nucleus of
experienced and committed staff from the charity, and
had also segregated the activity physically away from the
‘purely commercial’ culture of the rest of the firm, in a
unit with its own culture and management.
Another for-profit business had been started by a
founder of one of the non-profits. A third commercial
firm’s founder had taken the African wholesaling busi-
ness out from a commercial wholesaler and established
it independently as a family business. Asked why this
business model was chosen, the general manager said:
He ended up doing it as a private company because
that was easier than to make it a foundation [that is,
a non-profit enterprise]’
Furthermore, the stated ‘social mission’ of the for-
profit firms is a tool of effective competition in this
market. All these firms stated that it attracts socially
motivated staff and constitutes a signal of commitment
to good quality. Each firm, or separate division, mainly
or solely supplied non-profit, inter-governmental and
government buyers. All emphasised that this was a mar-
ket with rather few major players, so reputation was
key: several firms said their ‘core business’ was repeat
orders based in long term working relationships.
We asked each organisation whether non-profit status
in itself now constituted a market advantage, and the
predominant view was that it did not. The for-profit
firms were eligible to bid for most business, and while
they also sold to private buyers, each said it was a very
small part of their business. The non-profit wholesalers
did not sell to the private sector.
The experience of the charity that became a division
of a commercial firm illustrates this point, as the pro-
curement manager explained:
We thought initially the change from a charity to
commercial might have a negative impact, and it
wasn’t, after the first three months - most customers
came back.
The firm lost charitable discounts from suppliers - of
UK equipment in particular - when it ceased to be a
charity, but said suppliers observed them still working
in the charitable market, saw that ‘the customers are still
the same’ and that price lists showed no big mark-ups,
so ‘they are coming round’. The specialist focus on the
‘social’ market was presented as implicit evidence of
lack of profiteering, alongside the explicit social mission.
The marketing manager of the larger commercial firm
owning this division emphasised that he had had to
learn a different, less commercially aggressive marketing
style for this part of the business.
This ‘social market’ is thus a strongly relational mar-
ket: one interviewee called it ‘personalised’, requiring
‘constant talking to customers and suppliers’. Some
interviewees had spent their working lives in this mar-
ket, and knew their competitors well (’the usual sus-
pects’). These interactions have in turn shaped the
informal regulatory influence of non-profit enterprise,
since the cultural and behavioural feedback between
firms is very direct, allowing the weight of the non-
profit traders to influence the strategy of commercial
firms in the direction of social enterprise behaviour.
The benchmarking influence of one major firm, the
IDA, on the market’s regulatory norms emerges particu-
larly sharply. Analysis of the interviews showed that in
interviews with every competitor and with most interna-
tional organisations, the IDA was mentioned unprompted.
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Aspects of firms’ strategy were explained with reference to
the IDA. Thus one charity began to explain their niche by
saying: ‘we are not sort of, we are not an IDA’, meaning
not a non-profit wholesaler nor very large within the
market.
When asked what difference non-profit as opposed to
commercial status made in this market, several other
firms defined themselves in relation to the IDA. For
example, on product range:
we tend to be quite flexible in the range of articles we
supply, which is not similar to what IDA does in
maintaining a fixed list of essential drugs which they
claim to be very good value, in some cases they are
(for-profit firm)
And on prices, a charity said:
The thing is our prices are, compared to other orga-
nisations like IDA ...relatively high.
Two for-profit players said unprompted that the rela-
tionship with the IDA had shaped their mission and
strategy. As one put it:
we share a lot of history, you know, in the beginning
back from ‘75 to ‘78 we, you know, there was a very
close co-operation between IDA and [ourselves] (for-
profit firm)
In this case the relationship had later become more
competitive. Two for-profit companies had cooperated
in buying for a while, in order to get the volumes that
would allow them to compete:
because the big, big company in the business was
IDA.
One for-profit firm argued - slightly tongue-in-cheek -
that as far as:
the commercial aggressive approach is concerned I
would say eh, for many years IDA has been by far
the most aggressive player in the business.
This evidence of IDA’s key role in the discursive and
practical construction of market behaviour shows IDA
acting as a market-maker - being the first big indepen-
dent player - and as a benchmark firm and beneficial
competitor in the market as it evolved. According to our
interviewees it has influenced culture and helped to keep
down prices and put a floor under quality by providing a
‘fall back’ with known prices and reliable quality. This
benchmark role has also influenced the expectations of
downstream buyers. A charitable trading company man-
ager confirmed this, arguing furthermore that their own
role in the market had also influenced the behaviour of
the commercial firms, notably on quality:
our wholesalers are used to our high quality expecta-
tions, so I think in a way we triggered the market,
although we are the minor player .....And the same
goes for IDA.
The interaction of NGOs’ behaviour and buyer expec-
tations had thus shaped a Europe-based social market
supplied by enterprises - non-profit and for-profit - with
a distinctive social enterprise culture and terms of
trading.
Commercial responses and pressures on NGO traders
Medicines manufacturers, however, are affected by NGO
trading, and the trading practices of social enterprises
create new market opportunities that invite commercial
response. NGOs in all three sites have been affected by
the commercial responses of Indian manufacturers.
CDMU’s experience illustrates this type of problem.
CDMU’s intervention in the Indian medicines market,
coupled with changes in the industry, altered relation-
ships between MOs, manufacturers and distributors.
CDMU’s tender system is transparent: its Price List
issued to MOs specified the names of manufacturers.
This information then allowed larger MOs to approach
the manufacturers and negotiate directly. CDMU levies
a service charge of 10% on the drugs supplied, so
directly approaching manufacturers is cheaper for large
MOs. Moreover, CDMU’s success in expanding sales in
the early years attracted the notice of some manufac-
turers, who could obtain the names of the MOs from
the loosely structured administration of CDMU. Some
manufacturers/distributors then approached the larger
MOs, profiting by avoiding tendering costs and hassle.
A financially unstable CDMU could not always pay the
suppliers on time, so direct supply to MOs meant
prompt payment. In such cases they could even under-
cut the CDMU tender price. Many manufacturers now
supply large MOs directly.
CDMU also effectively introduced distributors to
MOs. Over time, these distributors started supplying
other drugs, and became competitors of CDMU. Thanks
to CDMU, MOs now know the market much better,
and now shop for themselves, even using tenders. Some
MOs have found drugs available in the wholesale market
at prices lower than CDMU prices (including metroni-
dazole, mebendazole, ranitidine, cotrimoxazole, cipro-
floxacin). If CDMU guaranteed quality, then some MOs
may have preferred CDMU despite higher prices. In its
absence CDMU loses markets.
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LOCOST is not immune to these pressures. Despite
its successes, expanding sales has not been easy and it
remains a relatively small market player: out of 468
companies in the retail formulations market in India
listed in the market surveys by ORG-IMS [43], 271 had
retail sales greater than LOCOST’s in 2007-08.
LOCOST’s competitors furthermore began to take note
of it as it grew. The pharmaceutical market has become
very competitive, and the recent upgrading increased
operating expenses and removed some of LOCOST’s
competitiveness. Pharmaceutical companies’ active mar-
keting includes incentives and inducements to influence
doctors, consumers and drug procuring institutions.
However LOCOST spends nothing on marketing. This
keeps its costs and prices low, but has also put it at a
competitive disadvantage when dealing with organiza-
tions that are susceptible to marketing gimmicks and
incentives. LOCOST - like CDMU - has also lost custo-
mers because of its policy of restricting its sales to
rational formulations.
In the European market too, Indian manufacturers try
to undercut the role of social enterprise. This social
market has patchy market information, and national
governments’ buying and handling capability is uneven.
There are many conflict and emergency situations, and
here too the independent wholesalers have been market-
makers. The interviews with wholesalers show that they
link quality assurance to assemblage and logistics,
strengthen supply chains, and complement direct pro-
curement by big international charities and United
Nations bodies. They can assemble complete parcels or
kits, rapidly and at high volume, from different manu-
facturers. The main firms stock large warehouses - for
example, IDA could supply 750 items from stock in
2006 - tying up substantial working capital. One inter-
viewee estimated US$5 million in stock was required to
be an effective wholesale market player.
However, market strategies of the Indian pharmaceuti-
cal companies threaten the viability of these activities,
and by 2006-7 were forcing a move of wholesaling out
of Europe. Since the mid- to late-1990s, Indian manu-
facturers have increasingly supplied some large buyers
such as government Central Medical Stores directly, by-
passing the European wholesalers. This created intense
price competition for large tenders, squeezing wholesale
margins, and all the firms were stated that they were
struggling to sustain quality assurance while drastically
lowering costs.
The main European-based wholesalers were therefore,
when interviewed, in the process of moving much of
their warehousing and logistics to India in an effort to
cut costs. The move was also driven by increasing strin-
gency of regulations concerning import of medicines
into the EU. The move was difficult, not least in dealing
with the complexity of legal and tax rules for foreign
companies operating in Free Economic Zones in India;
at least one firm, according to interviews and annual
reports, was losing money during the process.
Competition from manufacturers’ direct sales was said
to be particularly strong where purchasers were large,
efficient and well informed. One European wholesaler
described a learning process parallel to the Indian
NGOs’ experience:
What we were mainly doing is telling these guys
where it [the product] is coming from, so we are edu-
cating our customers
The manufacturers also benefited from wholesalers’
investment in market-making when wholesalers register
a manufacturer’s product in an African market, and
establish the product’s reputation:
And then you know, when everything is registered,
which takes a long time ... costs you a lot of money ...
then they start selling directly. ... we make the market
and then they come in and take over. (for-profit firm)
Two of the for-profit wholesalers interviewed were
diversifying into manufacturing, through joint ventures
with Indian firms, in order to learn about manufacturing
and to increase control and flexibility in supplying cus-
tomers. Wholesalers retained their added value when
assembling large lots of diverse medicines for emergency
supplies and kits for primary health facilities, and when
responding to large complex tenders for Central Medical
Stores which might require contracts with dozens of
manufacturers if purchased directly. But increasingly
warehousing and logistics had to be done in India to
stay competitive.
Another competitive tactic was to go more into supply
chain management within countries; as one manager
explained:
We are very good in the post-war countries or in the
countries where there is ... disorganisation. When the
country is getting more mature, then we are losing
market share.
For example, one for-profit firm was undertaking a com-
plex project that required support for local manufacturing
firms in a conflict-ridden country, including raw materials
supply to manufacturers and local assemblage and delivery
of local and imported supplies. One large non-profit trader
had long supported procurement capacity development,
including training, in developing countries.
The growing market for supply chain management
was also driven by major new funders. The Global
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Fund, PEPFAR and the Global TB Drug Facility have
financed high volumes of pharmaceuticals for HIV/
AIDS, malaria and TB. They typically require procure-
ment agents to buy and organise delivery on behalf of
the recipients of the funds. The huge sums flowing
through these market channels after 2004 forced exist-
ing wholesalers to rethink their roles, and the volumes
on offer attracted large firms as new market players.
PEPFAR’s Supply Chain Management System (SCMS)
brought in some US-based firms. The UNDP set up
IAPSO, its procurement arm, in 2004, to support in-
country procurement using Global Fund resources.
Established wholesalers then had to choose, as a for-
profit company director explained, between competing
for a major role as procurement agent for the big funds,
or being sidelined as a minor market player. A specia-
lised arm of IDA (then called IDA Solutions) was doing
antiretroviral (ARV) procurement for PEPFAR.
Increased concentration of buying power and procure-
ment had created closer market relationships, with a few
intermediaries playing multiple roles in bidding, issuing
tenders, wholesaling, and acting as purchasing agents:
‘corporatism’, one UN procurement manager called the
emerging market structure.
The firms interviewed also served areas of the market
- such as supplies to the UN and some big international
charities - that were less price sensitive, with less ten-
dering and more emphasis on speed, reliable response,
and safety as represented for example by supply of UK-
licensed generics (which, one interviewee said, have
become more competitive as Indian firms have bought
UK manufacturing plant and licences):
We may be slightly more expensive but we tailor to
their needs (for-profit firm)
A large international charity confirmed that they did
not generally issue tenders, relying on repeat orders
with established suppliers.
Many interviewees argued however that there had
been an over-emphasis on driving down prices of stan-
dard items, such as basic antibiotics sourced in India,
through tendering:
For many of those products we are down to rock bot-
tom prices and there is actually exit from the manu-
facturers who produce them (UN interviewee)
Experienced wholesale buyers felt increasingly trapped
between pressures that worsened market incentives to
cheat:
you can’t have wildly diverging things ... someone
saying, oh, you’ve got to get the prices down, and by
the way you’ve got to have this quality standard, the
golden standard ... they will try to cut corners (UN
interviewee)
The interviews included a number of anecdotes about
tenders accepted on price alone producing poor quality.
Repeated worries were expressed that independent
wholesaling was being squeezed out and the market
‘skewed’, weakening broader medicines procurement.
Procurement managers interviewed were also finding
the number of reputable suppliers becoming danger-
ously small, as Indian manufacturers turned to more
profitable use of their production lines. The most repu-
table Indian manufacturers were losing interest in sup-
plying basic generics to the low priced African market
except in key high volume areas such as ARVs, and the
Tanzanian market was therefore increasingly supplied
mainly by second tier Indian firms with less strong qual-
ity reputations [35].
Social enterprise wholesaling in Africa: a developmental
opportunity?
The commercial responses to social enterprise trading in
essential medicines have opened up opportunities for a
developmental role for Africa-based social enterprise.
The two Tanzanian NGO traders interviewed had strong
European NGO links: both purchased from IDA, and
one was a ‘daughter’ company of a European charitable
trader. Furthermore, like the Europeans, the Tanzanian
firms were selling into a strongly defined social market
segment of Tanzanian health care, the faith-based and
NGO facilities, and interacting with their culture and
values. This market segment was also strongly influ-
enced by the large public wholesaler which supplied
many NGO facilities and exerted downward pressure on
prices. The NGO wholesalers did not supply the private
sector.
Tanzania continues to require trustworthy quality
assurance intermediaries between manufacturers and
buyers. The WHO pre-qualification of medicines for
AIDS, TB and malaria focuses on medicines for which
there is high market concentration among buyers and
suppliers, and works well where the costs to a supplier
of being caught cheating on quality or source of supply
are high. In the wider essential medicines market, the
incentive structures remain problematic, since high
numbers of plants supplying a large range of medicines
cannot be constantly re-inspected, and wholesalers are
therefore needed to assemble large orders, check origins,
and guarantee quality and the integrity of the whole
supply chain.
The European firms were encountering no interna-
tional competition from Indian social enterprise in
wholesaling. None of our interviewees could identify an
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Indian social wholesaler in the export of essential medi-
cines from India to Africa; one commented that this
was odd, given Indian entrepreneurial flair. Reasons sug-
gested included the relatively undeveloped nature of
social entrepreneurship in India and its concentration
on its domestic market problems, along with a lack of
concern in India with African problems.
It follows that a space has opened up for African and
Africa-based social entrepreneurship, as the two
Tanzanian NGOs interviewed made clear. Action
Medeor Europe said that it had specifically chosen to
move, not to India but to Africa:
we had actually the choice between opening some-
thing in Asia, like IDA ... to reduce cost ... or an
alternative way could have been to open a local
[African] office where you buy strictly locally regis-
tered drugs..... And we thought, which would be more
helpful for the country?
The charity therefore decided to set up a non-profit
wholesaler in Tanzania, to sell to the non-profit sector
locally and perhaps to export to the region. A strength
of this experiment is that it has clear synergies with the
interests of the growing local pharmaceutical manufac-
turing industry in East Africa, including Tanzania. Shut
out of the Global Fund ‘segment’ of the market to date
by the stringent requirements of WHO prequalification,
the local industry has been successfully upgrading and
needs markets to develop [35]. A shift of social enter-
prise wholesaling towards supporting this growth - by
undertaking their own quality assurance - has the poten-
tial to support this development and provide an alterna-
tive location for social enterprise regulatory impact.
Conclusions
This study has documented a largely unstudied segment
of essential medicines markets, NGO wholesaling,
through interviews with most NGO traders, with NGO
facilities buying from those wholesalers, and with for-
profit competitors in Europe and Tanzania. The metho-
dology is qualitative and exploratory. The interviews
provide a quite exhaustive snapshot of the business his-
tory, organisation and behaviour of this NGO sector in
India, Europe and Tanzania. The data set is not longitu-
dinal and the international ‘social’ market in particular
still lacks quantitative documentation outside the seg-
ment of high-profile large scale procurement of HIV/
AIDS, TB and malaria medicines. Our findings strongly
argue however for the importance of this sector for pro-
moting access to essential medicines by the poorest peo-
ple. Furthermore, our findings, as summarised below,
can generate hypotheses for future research.
The social enterprise traders studied in this article are
all addressing a huge problem: the large numbers of low
income people who lack access to safe, rationally pre-
scribed and appropriate medicines in India, Africa and
elsewhere. All the enterprises had intervened effectively
to improve access. Those that had sustained quality
assurance and control, while achieving financial stability
including access to support from donors, demonstrated
that social enterprise in manufacturing and distribution
can effectively create sustainable low cost procurement
options for organizations serving the most disadvan-
taged. Such direct impact on access to medicines
depends in turn on effective value-based management
and the capability to retain value-oriented staff.
We have also shown that medicines markets and man-
ufacturers respond competitively to NGO intervention,
forcing social enterprises repeatedly to rethink their
strategy. In particular, transparent procurement by
NGOs can improve market functioning but also open
up opportunities for direct supply by manufacturers to
large organisations that undermine in turn the role of
the NGO wholesalers. Social enterprise traders are thus
under constant pressure from their own success.
Third, we have shown that social enterprise medicines
traders can exercise a broader informal regulatory influ-
ence on their markets by influencing the norms and cul-
ture of their commercial competitors. Success in this
requires not only effective, value-based management and
quality assurance capability, but also funding bodies and
purchasers with a social commitment to quality at low
cost, and NGOs that are large enough relative to the
market to play a benchmarking role. In India, the NGOs
have not attained that scale except where, as in the
‘Delhi model’, they work with public procurement. In
Europe, IDA and other NGOs effectively played that
role from the 1970s past the turn of this century,
though the market is now in flux. In Tanzania, there
appears to be space opening up for an effective role
working with public wholesalers and NGO facilities; the
bonus is that in Tanzania as perhaps elsewhere in East
Africa, effective social entrepreneurship of this type
could help to support local industrial reconstruction and
more secure pharmaceutical supply.
The social enterprises studied here were partially substi-
tuting for weak formal regulation. Formal regulation has
improved somewhat in the international and Tanzanian
markets in recent years. However all these markets con-
tinue to be weakly regulated, and some recent market
pressures have strengthened incentives to reduce quality.
It follows that social enterprise wholesaling of the type
discussed here needs to be appreciated, sustained and
promoted by health policy makers unless or until formal
regulation becomes much more effective.
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